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IN THE SUPRE.ME COURT
of the

s·TATE OF UTAH

GERALD KAY MERKLEY, a taxpayer,
for himself and all others similarly
situated,
Plaintiff and Appellant}
vs.
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body politic
and corporate, and SALT LAKE CITY,
a municipal corporation of the State of
Utah '
Def end ants an d Respondents.

Case No.
9393

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants agree with the statement of facts set forth
by plaintiff and further state that this is an action brought by
plaintiff to test the validity of Chapter 114, Laws of Utah,
1959. Plaintiff urges the invalidity and unconstitutionality of
the act. Defendants claim that the act is in all respects valid
1
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and constitutional. For the conventence of the court a brief
resume of the act is set forth herewith:
Section 1 of the said act sets out its title as ((the uniform
local sales and use tax law of Utah.''
Section 2 of the act is a declaration of the legislative
purpose that the revenues derived from taxation under the
act be used to finance capital outlay requirements and service
bonded indebtedness of local taxing units.
Section 3 provides that counties, cities, and towns may
levy sales and use taxes in accordance with the terms of the
act and prohibits cities and towns from levying such tax unless
the county has first levied such tax.
The first section numbered 4 provides that the tax shall
be Yz% upon retail sales within the counties, cities and towns;
provides that the levy shall conform to the state sales tax
act; provides that the local taxing unit shall contract with the
state tax commission to perform the services incident to the
administration and operation of the ,sales or use tax; and
further provides for an exemption from the Yz% sales and
use tax if a like amount has already been paid to another
local taxing unit within the state.
The second section numbered 4 provides that the local
taxing unit must maintain its ordinances in accordance with
the provisions of the state sales and use tax law and must
change the local law as the state law is changed.
Section 5 provides for a county use tax similar to first
section numbered 4 relating to sales taxes.
Section 6 provides for collection by the state tax com2
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mission and further provides that the state tax commission may
charge a fee not to exceed 2V2% of the amount collected.
Section 7 pruvides that the tax commission may determine
the situs of the consummation of retail sales where the
retailer has not a single definite fixed place of ·business and
further provides that it may establish a formula whereby the
revenues collected by public utilities may be apportioned to
the local taxing units.
Section 8 provides for a presumption that intrastate retail
sales are consummated at the place of business of the retailer.
Section 9 provides that the act is inseparable and the
invalidity of one provision voids all.
Section 10 provides for an effective date of the local tax
levy.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
CHAPTER 114, LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, DOES NOT
VIOLATE ARTICLE VI, SECTION 29 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
POINT II.
CHAPTER 114, LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, CONFORMS
TO ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 5 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
3
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POINT III.
CHAPTER 114, LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, DOES NOT
UNLAWFULLY DELEGATE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY,
NOR DOES IT UNLAWFULLY INTERFERE WITH THE
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS OF COUNTIES OR MUNICIPALITIES.
POINT IV.
CHAPTER 114, LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, IS NOT VOID
FOR LACK OF UNIFORMITY.
POINT V.
CHAPTER 114, LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, IS SUFFICIENTLY DEFINITE AND REASONABLE.

ARGUMENT
POINTS I, II, III
I. CHAPTER 114, LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, DOES NOT
VIOLATE ARTICLE VI, SECTION 29 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
II. CHAPTER 114, LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, CONFORMS
TO ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 5 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
III. CHAPTER 114, LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, DOES
NOT UNLAWFULLY D E L E G AT E LEGISLATIVE
.·l
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AUTHORITY, NOR DOES IT UNLAWFULLY INTERFERE WITH THE GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS OF
COUNTIES OR MUNICIPALITIES.
Defendants for simplicity will combine their first three
points for argument inasmuch as all three relate to the questions
of unlawful delegation of power and unlawful interference
with local self -government.
Article VI, Section 29 of the Utah Constitution provides:
((The Legislature shall not delegate to any special
commission, private corporation or association, any
power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, money, property or effects, . . .
to levy taxes, . . . or to perform any municipal functions."
Article XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution provides:
((The Legislature shall not impose taxes for the purpose of any county, city, town or other municipal corporation, but may, by law, vest in the corporate authorities, thereof, respectively, the power to assess and
collect taxes for all purposes of such corporation.''
The obvious purpose of these two articles of the Utah
Constitution is to provide for the municipalities and counties
of this state the right to local self-government. Local selfgovernment has historically been one of the bulwarks of
American liberty and it was the intention of the constitution
makers that the right to it be preserved and maintained inviolate. As was stated in Best Foods v. Christensen, 75 Utah 392,
285 Pac. 1001:

((There can be no doubt but that the framers of our
state Constitution recognized the rights of the people

5
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of Utah to local self-government. It was to preserve
local self-government free from needless legislative
interference that the power to levy taxes for local
purposes was by the state Constitution vested exclusively in the proper authorities of counties, cities, towns,
and other municipal corporations. The power to collect
and control the revenues of a municipality is of the
very essence of local self-government. The same reasons
that may be urged against legislative interference with
a levy of a general property tax for municipal purposes
apply to the imposing of a license tax by the Legislature
for purely municipal purposes. The levy of either tax
by the Legislature interferes with local self-government. Upon principle and the great weight of authority,
section 5 of article 13 of our state Constitution precludes the Legislature from imposing a license tax
upon the inhabitants of a city, town or county for the
sole purpose of raising revenue for such city, town, or
county."
This Honorable Court has always been zealous in preserving the right of municipalities and counties to local selfgovernment. See Logan City v. Public Utilities Commission,
72 Utah 536, 271 Pac. 961, and State Water Pollution Control
Board v. Salt Lake City, 6 Utah 2d 247, 311 P.2d 370. However, Chapter 114, Laws of Utah, 1959, does not interfere with
local self-government. Counties and municipalities are given
discretion as to whether or not they wish to adopt the tax.
The tax is not imposed by the legislature for the benefit of
local taxing units, but is imposed by the various counties and
municipalities by their various duly elected and appointed
representatives; viz, their boards of city commissioners and
boards of county commissioners. The local citizenry, through
their duly elected representatives, have the power to deter(.
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mine whether or not the tax will be imposed. The legislature
has simply prescribed certain conditions which must take effect
if the tax in question is levied. The most important of these
is that the local authority must contract with the State Tax
Commission to collect the tax. This is not a burdensome requiren1ent for cities, nor is it burdensome upon the taxpaying
citizen, foi the 'Tax Commission is already collecting on behalf
of the state a state-wide sales tax for state-wide purposes.
It \vill be readily seen that the only practical and inexpensive way to assess and collect a local sales tax is for the
State Tax Commission to collect it at the same time it collects
the state tax and then remit to the local taxing units. Historically, local taxing units have always found it necessary
to employ collectors of taxes for the taxes that they have levied.
Generally these are individuals, but quite often, may be other
entities. McQuillin, in his work, Municipal Corporations, states:
Section 44.131: ((Power to levy and collect taxes, it
is commonly held, carries with it the implied power to
employ the necessary and usual procedure to execute
the power and collect the revenue contemplated by the
grant of power to make the levy.''
Section 44.132: ((In many cities, taxes are collected
upon behalf of municipalities by county officers, who
become agents of the city for the purpose."
Section 44.13 3: ((Except where such duty is imposed
upon and restricted to particular municipal officers, a
municipal corporation, unless forbidden by statute or
charter, may make a contract with any person to collect
its taxes, and authority to contract for collection of
delinquent taxes may be authorized by legislative act.
Thus a municipal corporation having full power in the
premises may employ banks as collection agencies and
agree with them concerning remittances."
7
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In support of this last statement, lvicQuillin cites Best
Foods v. Christensen, supra.
Insofar as unlawful delegation of power to the State
Tax Commission is concerned, it will at once be noted that the
act in question does not give power to the State Tax Commission to determine whether or not the tax will be imposed,
but merely gives it the power to determine facts. The tax is
imposed by the municipalities and the counties, and the State
Tax Commission is simply given the duty and the right to
determine whether or not the tax is to be paid by a particular
individual and where it is to be paid in order to determine
to whom 1t will be remitted. In other words, rather than delegating legislative power, the act simply delegates to the Tax
Commission the power to determine the facts upon which the
act will operate. Under modern-day standards of delegation,
this type of delegation is not unlawful. In Revne v. Trade
Commission, 113 Utah 155, 192 P.2d 563, this court said:

CWe recognize, of course, that the legislature may
properly delegate to some administrative body the
duty of ascertaining the facts upon which the provisions of a law are to function, . . . The question of
an improper delegation of legislative authority lies
imbedded in the extent of the power granted to the
administrative body."
c

If the counties and municipalities think too much power
has been delegated to the tax commission, they have the option
not to levy the tax in question. There is no law compelling
them to impose the tax and delegate the power to collect the
same to the State Tax Commission unless they wish to do so.
However, in view of the fact that in this action the city and
8
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the county are not complaining of an unlawful delegation
but are rather seeking to uphold the sales tax act, the Court
should not be overly concerned with this question of the
authority of the Tax Commission to interfere with the municipal monies, property or improvements. See Bailey v. VanDyke,
66 Utah 184, 240 Pac. 454. In that case, under authority of
state statute, defendant Weber County made an agreement
with the U.S.A.C. and the director of the U. S. Extension
Service to cooperate with these agencies and to assist in certain
basic research. Defendant County agreed to assume some cost.
Plaintiff contended that the legislation authorizing this type
of agreement was unconstitutional and void, because the legislature had imposed taxes for county purposes. The court
rejected this contention, saying:
((This claim is wholly insupportable because the
statute in question does not impose any obligation
whatever upon the county. The county is merely given
legal power to enter into the contract and provide the
funds or not, as its duly constituted officers may elect.
There is no imposition of taxes, direct or indirect, by
legislative authority upon the county, and no interference with local self-government by the county."
The act in question is similar to the legislation in the
Bailey v. VanDyke case in that it gives the local taxing unit
the power to determine whether or not it will levy the tax
and there can be no possible interference with local selfgovernment unless the tax is levied and even then there is
no unlavv·ful interference with county or municipal government.
Plaintiff also contends that t he act delegates certain
municipal powers to the county in that it authorizes cities to

9
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enact the tax only after counties have done so. Plaintiff states
that after enactment by the county, cities are forced to enact
the legislation or their citizens will suffer taxation without
benefit. This is not correct, for the citizens of cities \vithin a
county are also citizens of the county and it must be assumed
that county levies are spent for the benefit of all citizens of
the county. Therefore there is not taxation without benefit.
The act does not delegate the power to the county to determine
whether or not the city will levy the tax, but simply prohibits
the levy by the city in the first instance unless a county-wide
tax has been imposed. There are good economic reasons
justifying the insertion of these provisions into the act by the
legislature and this is purely a matter for legislative discretion
with which the court will not interfere.

POINT IV.
CHAPTER 114, LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, IS NOT VOID
FOR LACK OF UNIFORMITY.
Plaintiff devotes a good portion of his brief to argumg
that the act in question allows some municipalities and counties
to levy a tax and allows other municipalities and counties
not to levy a tax. This is true, but does not render the law
invalid, for nowhere in the statutes or constitution is there
any requirement that all counties, municipalities or local taxing
units must have the same tax rates. The only constitutional
requirement is that the operation of a statute must be uniforn1
throughout the state. Certainly, the operation of this statute
is uniform throughout the state. All counties have the option
10
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provided for in the statute and once the county has enacted
an ordinance in accordance therewith, all municipalities within
the county have likewise the same option. If a uniform tax
levy were required throughout the state, the tax levy of every
local taxing unit would be faulty, for it is common knowledge
that each taxing unit within the state imposes taxes at a
different rate and that even within Salt Lake County there
are numerous separate and distinct taxing units which allow
the imposition of one tax upon a resident of the county and
a different tax upon other residents of the county located in
a different taxing unit.
Uniformity of taxation means uniformity within a local
taxing district as was stated by the court in the Town of Palm
Beach v. City of West Palm Beach, Florida, 55 So. 2d 566:
"It is quite true that Section 1 of Article IX of the
Constitution requires the Legislature to provide for ta
uniform and equal rate of taxation.' This provision
of the Constitution has been construed many times to
mean that the rate of taxation for state purposes shall
be uniform throughout the state, for county purposes
uniform throughout the county, for municipal purposes
throughout the municipality and for district purposes
throughout the district.
"It was clearly the legislative intent and mandate
that the taxes to be levied should be levied by the
respective municipalities and that the rate of taxation
in each municipality should be uniform.''
It is equally clear that in this case it was the clear intent
of the legislature that the rate of tax throughout each respective
municipality should be uniform.
11
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The Legislature in this instance has required more uniformity than is generally required of taxing acts, since it
required uniformity of the sales tax within a county. This is
accomplished through the provisions which provide that a
city may not levy the tax until the county has first levied it
and then that the citizen may have a credit against his county
tax if he owes a tax to a municipality. It is difficult to comprehend how the legislature could have enacted a more uniform
tax act which would have given local governments needed
tax revenues, since the legislature could not, in view of Article
XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution, impose a state-wide
tax for local purposes.
Plaintiff's argument that the tax statute gives a free rein
to the municipalities to impose any sort of tax that they wish
without limit is certainly a strained and unreasonable interpretation of the act. The statute in its title provides that the
taxes shall be integrated ((In order to establish uniformity of
taxation within a county,'' and Section 3 of the act provides
that the county's, city's and town's levy of a sales tax must
be in accordance with the provisions of the act. It is clear
beyond any doubt that statutes attacked upon constitutional
grounds must be construed if possible so that they will be
constitutional and not unconstitutional. As was succinctly
pointed out in the case of Leatham v. Reger, 54 Utah 491,
182 Pac. 187:
nit is elementary doctrine universally applied in this
country that, if an act is open to two interpretations
or constructions, one of which creates a conflict with
some constitutional provisions, while the other makes
the act harmonious with the Constitution, it is the

12
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duty of the courts to adopt the latter interpretation
and construction.'·
Another rule of construction that has universal application
to taxing statutes is that the constitution is a limitation only
upon the taxing power of the legislature and is not a grant of
such power thereto. In Garrett Freight Lines v. Tax Comm.,
103 Utah 390, 135 P.2d 523, the court quotes from Kimball t'.
Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 57 Pac. 1, in part as follows:
~ ~ ~The

taxing power of the state is lodged absolutely in the legislature, and, as the responsibility of
enacting laws devolves exclusively upon that branch
of the government, whether the right of taxation has
been exercised justly or unjustly, wisely or unwisely, it
is not for the judiciary to inquire ...
'' 'The people of a state therefore give to their
government a right of taxing themselves and their
property, and, as the exigencies of government cannot
be limited, they prescribe no limits to the exercise of
this right, resting confident! y on the interest of the
legislator, and in the influence of the constituents over
their representative, to guard them against its abuse.''
Consequently, if the proper rules of statutory and constitutional construction and limitations are followed, the claims
of plaintiff that the statute lacks state-wide uniformity and
that cities and towns have been given a license to enact sales
taxes without regard to the one-half per cent limit should be
disregarded by this honorable court, since these claims are
based upon strained and unreasonable constructions of the
statute and the Utah Constitution.
Plaintiff's contention that the act allows double taxation
ts also a strained and unreasonable construction of the act.

13
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Since all taxes are remitted through the state tax commission,
the credit must likewise be given by them. Consequently, the
tax commission is allowed to offset for the individual taxpayer
who is making remittance to the tax commission the amount
of his city tax against what would otherwise be charged him
under the levy of his county tax. Both taxes are indeed ''due''
and payable at the same time upon the remittance to the state
tax commission and consequently, the taxpayer is allowed a
credit against his county tax for the payment of taxes Cldue"
the city.

POINT V.
CHAPTER 114, LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, IS SUFFICIENTLY DEFINITE AND REASONABLE.
The act is entirely clear, certain and reasonable in its
operation and application. Counties, cities and towns of the
state have been receiving revenue therefrom from collections
by the state tax commission without a scintilla of reportable
dispute, discussions or differences. The act has functioned
well for the time it has been in operation and neither the county,
city, or tax commission are having difficulty with the interpretation or enforcement of the act.

CONCLUSION
From all that appears herein, it is clear from a reasonable
construction of the statute in question and the Utah Con-

14
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stitutional provisions that the statute is in all respects a valid
and constitutional exercise of the legislative power of the
state, and is in all respects a valid and enforceable enactment.
The trial court's decision should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,

JAMES L. BARKER, JR.
City Attorney

GROVER A. GILES
County Attorney

NORMAN W. KETTNER
Assistant City Attorney

LOUIS M. HAYNIE
Deputy County Attorney

DAVID E. WEST
Assistant Attorney General
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Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents
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